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ABSTRACT
This paper concerns decisions under uncertainty in which the proba-
bilities of the states of nature are known only approximately. Decision
problems involving three states of nature are studied, since some key
issues do not arise in two-state problems, while probability spaces with
more than three states of nature are essentially impossible to graph.
The primary focus is on two levels of probabilistic information. In
one level, the three probabilities are separately rounded to the nearest
tenth. This can lead to sets of rounded probabilities which add up to
0.9, 1.0, or 1.1. In the other level, probabilities are rounded to the
nearest tenth in such a way that the rounded probabilities are forced to
sum to 1.0. For comparison, six additional levels of probabilistic
information, previously analyzed in (Whalen, 1991), were also included
in the present analysis.
A simulation experiment compared four criteria for decisionmaking
using linearly constrained probabilities (Maximin, Midpoint, Standard
Laplace, and Extended Laplace) under the eight different levels of
information about probability. The Extended Laplace criterion, which
was introduced in [Whalen, 1991] using a second order maximum entropy
principle, performed best overall.
Risk and Uncertainty
The general problem of decision making under uncertainty involves a
set of n states of nature, a set of k alternative actions, and a utility
function that assigns a vector of n values to each alterative action;
each element of this vector specifies the value of the action under the
corresponding state of nature. The k utility vectors typically take the
form of row vectors collected into a kXn utility matrix associating a
specific value to each (state, action) pair.
Standard treatments of decision making under uncertainty fall into
two separate branches: decisions under risk and decisions under ignor-
ance [Resnik 1986]. Under risk, the numeric probability of each state
of nature is also assumed to be known or estimated. This enables us to
reduce the utility vector of each alternative action to a single number,
the expected utility found by adding the product of each utility times
the probability of the corresponding state of nature. The action whose
expected utility is highest is selected.
Under ignorance, there is no knowledge at all about the prob-
abilities of the states of nature. Various criteria exist^for making a
decision without recourse to probability. Implicitly*or explicitly,
each of these criteria replaces the weighting role of the missing
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probability values with some other weighting scheme to reduce the vector
of possible utilities of an action under the various states of nature to
a single value to facilitate comparisons between alternative actions.
The Laplace criterion emphasizes all states of nature equally. The Hur-
wicz criterion (of which maximax and maxinnn are special cases) emphasi-
zes the most favorable and/or the most unfavorable states of nature.
The minimax regret criterion emphasizes the states of nature for which
the decision makes the most difference.
Intermediate Cases
In practice, most real decisions use probability information that
falls between the well studied extremes of pure risk and pure ignor-
ance. This is especially true in team decision making [Ho & Chu 1972]
when one team member assesses a probability distribution but because of
time or other constraints can only communicate a standard, concise
description of the distribution to the actual decision maker. Each
message that can be sent corresponds to a region within a probability
space with (n-1) dimensions, where n is the number of states of nature.
Note that the authors and publishers of handbooks, almanacs, or other
sources of potentially useful information can be viewed as generalized
"teammates" of everyone who consults their publications.
For example, sometimes we have enough information to arrange the
possible states of nature in order from most probable to least probable,
or at least identify some as more probable than others, without being
able to numerically specify the probabilities of individual states of
nature. This ordinal information may come as a summary message from a
teammate, or more directly -- e.g. by observing a random walk process
after an unknown number of steps. Alternatively, we may have inform-
ation about which states of nature, if any, have a probability above a
specified threshold.
A very important special case of incomplete probability information
arises when probabilities are in rounded form; for example, we may be
told that P(A) = .2, P(B)=.3, and P(C) =.4 to the nearest tenth. (A, B,
and C are a mutually exclusive exhaustive event set whose unrounded
probabilities must sum to 1.) When the probabilities are each rounded
to the nearest tenth, it is possible that the sum of the rounded proba-
bilities will not equal 1.0. In practice, rounded distributions of this
sort are sometimes communicated as-is, but sometimes the probability
distribution as a whole is rounded to the nearest set of three probabil-
ities adding to 1.0. Table 1 shows three sets of exact probabilities,
which yield different rounded probabilities when rounded separately but
all yield the same rounded distribution when forced to sum to 1.0.
Table 1: Two Methods for Rounding Probabilities
Unrounded Probabilities
(.333, .336, .331)
(.310, .360, .330)
(.366, .367, .266)
Rounded Separately
(.3, .3, .3)
(.3, .4, .3)
(.4, .4, .3)
Rounded to add to 1.0
(.3, .4, .3)
(.3, .4, .3)
(.3, .4, .3)
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Linear Probability Constraints & Dempster-Shaf er Evidence
The Dempster-Snafer theory of evidence [Shafer, 1976] concerns one
particular type of incomplete probability knowledge, represented by
basic probability assignments. However, this model does not account
for some kinds of probability knowledge that are of great practical
importance.
Probability threshold information cannot reliably be expressed by
basic probability assignments. For example, with three states of
nature we can represent all messages about probability thresholds of
1/4 or 1/3 by basic probability assignments, but not all messages
about a probability threshold of 1/2 can be so represented.
When there are only two possible states of nature, the ordinal
information that state 1 is more probable than state 2 corresponds to
the probability threshold information that P(sl)>.5. This can be
represented by the basic probability assignment m(sl)=.5, m(s2)=0,
m(slUs2)=.5. However, when there are more than two possible states of
nature, ordinal information about probabilities can never be expressed
by basic probability assignments.
Rounded probabilities can sometimes be represented by basic
probability assignments, but not when the rounded probabilities add up
to less than 1.0. For example, probabilities of .33, .33, and .34
would be rounded to .3, .3, and .3. The knowledge that the true
probability distribution is somewhere in the region of probability
space that rounds to (.3,.3,.3) would provide a useful approximation
to the true probabilities, but it cannot be expressed as a basic
probability assignment. When probabilities are forced to sum to 1.0,
none of the resulting regions of probability space can be represented
by basic probability assignments.
All the above cases, and many others, can be expressed by systems
of linear constraints on probabilities. In such a case, the available
information restricts the probability to lie within a particular
region in probability space.
Partial Second Order Ignorance
If a decision maker receives enough information to determine a
precise (objective or subjective) probability assessment, the
probability region reduces to a single point and the recipient faces a
problem of decision making under pure risk. On the other hand, if the
recipient can derive no information about the sender's subjective
probabilities, the probability region is the whole of probability
space, constrained only by the ordinary axioms of probability. In
this case, the recipient's problem is equivalent to decision making
under pure ignorance.
In the general case, the decision maker knows that the probability
distribution over the n states of nature is somewhere within a
constrained region r in the probability space. Each point in T
specifies an ordinary probability distribution over the states of
nature relevant to the original decision problem. This probability
distribution together with the payoff matrix for (state-action) pairs
in turn specifies an expected value for each action. Thus each point
in the region of possible probability distributions specifies an
expected utility for each action. The decision maker knows that the
true probability distribution over states of nature corresponds to one
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of the points in r, but has no information about the relative
likelihood of the points within the region.
This is equivalent to a second order problem of decision making
under ignorance. In the second order formulation, the n discrete
states of nature are replaced by a continuum of second order "states,"
where each second order state is a probability distribution over first
order states. If the set of second order states includes the full
n-nomial probability space, then second order ignorance is equivalent
to first order ignorance. In partial second order ignorance, the set
of possible second order states equals the region T (probability
distributions that satisfy the constraints arising from partial
knowledge about the probabilities).
The payoff for a particular alternative action under a particular
second order state equals the expected payoff for that action under
the probability distribution over first order states specified by the
second order state in question. The decision maker must choose an
alternative action in the absence of any information about the second
order probability distribution, except that it is within the set of
distributions specified by. Thus, it is necessary to rely upon some
other consideration to weight the expected return or regret of each
probability distribution, in the same way as in ordinary decision
making under ignorance.
It is relatively straightforward to find the corner points of a
region in probability space defined by a system of linear constraints
and to calculate the expected return arising from each alternative
action at each corner point. For any possible probability distribu-
tion, the expected return for an action is a linear combination of the
expected returns of that action at these corner points. Therefore the
maximum and minimum expected return for each alternative action can be
found by examining only these corner points.
Graphical Analysis When n=3
Suppose that the uncertainty of a decision problem concerns just
three possible states of nature. The space of possible probability
distributions with respect to these three events forms a planar tri-
angle bisecting the unit cube, as shown in Figure 1. This fact
enables us to graph any trinomial probability as a point on a set of
triangular coordinates. The three corners of the triangle represent
respectively the three trivial probability distributions which assign
a probability of 1 to the corresponding states of nature.
Figure 2 shows the 66 regions of probability space that arise from
rounding the probability distribution to the nearest decile probabili-
ty distribution that sums to 1.0. The hexagonal regions represent
cases where none of the three rounded probabilities equal zero. The
small triangles at the three corners represent the cases when one
probability is rounded to 1.0 and the other two are rounded to zero.
The pentagons represent cases where one probability is rounded to zero
and the other two rounded probabilities are both nonzero.
Figure 3 shows the 166 different regions of probability space that
arise from separately rounding each of the three probabilities to the
nearest tenth. The hexagonal regions represent cases where the three
rounded probabilities add up to 1.0. The small triangles at the three
corners represent the cases when one probability is rounded to 1.0 and
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the other two are rounded to zero. The trapezeids represent cases
where one probability is rounded to zero and the other two rounded
probabilities add up to 1.0. The upwards pointing triangles contain
probability distributions such as (.86,.06,.08) which when rounded add
up to more than 1.0. Finally, the downwards pointing triangles
contain probability distributions such as (.84.,03,.13) or
(.94,.03,.03) which when rounded add up to less than 1.0.
Decision Criteria
A logical first step in making a decision under uncertainty is
dominance screening. Potter & Anderson [1980] discuss dominance
screening in the context of linearly constrained Bayesian priors.
Ordinary linear programming can find the maximum and minimum values of
the difference between the expected utility (EU) of one alternative
and that of another. One alternative decision dominates another if
the maximum and the minimum difference have the same sign. (A common
error is to assume that the maximum EU of the dominated act must be
less than the minimum EU of the act that dominates it. In fact two
utility ranges can overlap even if one action always has greater EU
than the other for each particular feasible probability distribution.)
Typically, more than one nondominated alternative will remain. To
reach a final decision, it is helpful to calculate a figure of merit
to represent the attractiveness of each action by a single number.
When each state's probability is fully determined, expected utility is
the figure of merit. When the probability is underdetermined, there
are two approaches to calculating a figure of merit. One approach
first evaluates the range of expected utilities possible for an action
and then reduces this range to a single representative expected
utility. The other approach first reduces the range of probability
distributions to a single distribution and then calculates just one
expected utility using this representative probability distribution.
Representative Utility Approaches
The two most common ways to reduce a range of utilities to a
single figure of merit are the maximin criterion and the midpoint
criterion. Both are special cases of the Hurwicz family of criteria,
which use a general weighted average of the minimum and maximum
possible utility: maximin uses a weight of 1.0 for the lower bound and
midpoint uses a weight of .5. The maximin criterion expresses conserv-
atism in decision making, while the midpoint criterion seeks to opti-
mize average performance.
The extended Hurwicz criterion selects the action for which
o*(max(E(return))) + (l-a)*(min(E(return)))
is greatest, where max and min are taken over the set of admissible
probability distributions and expectation is taken over states of
nature according to each particular distribution. In particular, when
the optimism coefficient a equals zero the extended Hurwicz criterion
becomes extended maximin. Assuming that the observed decision maker's
probability assessment is correct and remains constant for many itera-
tions of the observing decision maker's action, the long-run average
return of the extended maximin criterion's selected action cannot
possibly fall below the indicated value, while that of other actions
might be below this value for some possible probability distribution.
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Similarly, when o=.5 the extended Hurwicz criterion becomes the
extended midpoint criterion, while when o=l it reduces to the extended
maximax criterion.
Representative Probability Approaches
Dn the other hand, many authors [Jaynes, 1968; Gottinger, 1990]
argue that uncertainties about probabilities ought to be resolved as
objectively as possible; in other words, without reference to utili-
ties. If this principle is accepted, Gottinger has shown that the
only reasonable choice for a representative probability distribution
from a range is the distribution whose entropy is highest (the Laplace
criterion). These arguments are convincing, but their direct applica-
tion to the probabilities of states of nature can lead to discarding
most or all of the available information. For example, the standard
maximum entropy (Laplace) form for a complete order over probabilities
is equivalent to the maximum entropy form for total ignorance!
This dilemma can be resolved using a second order maximum entropy
concept that preserves more real information while satisfying the re-
quirements that motivate the original maximum entropy concept. [Whalen
& Brdnn, 1990] Rather than considering the probability distribution
over the original set of states, we consider a second-order probabili-
ty distribution over points in probability space (see Figures 1-3).
Applying the maximum entropy principle to this distribution implies
that all points in probability space should be considered equally
likely. Thus the representative point for a region of probability
space is the mean point of that region.
Geometrically, the ordinary maximum entropy distribution for a
region in probability space (as in Figures 1 & 2) is the point in the
region closest to the center of the entire probability space. The
second-order maximum entropy distribution for a region is the center
of that region itself. Under total ignorance, the region in question
is the entire probability space, and both versions of maximum entropy
select the same representative point; i.e. the center of the space.
Simulation Experiments
[Whalen, 1991] reports a series of simulation experiments that
compared the four methods of determining a figure of merit (Maximin,
Midpoint, Standard Laplace, and Extended Laplace) using six different
information systems:
(1) the null information system in which the decision maker has no
information about probability,
(2) an ordinal information system in which the decision maker can rank
the 3 probabilities from lowest to highest (6 possible messages),
(3) an information system that informs the decision maker which
probability, if any, is above .5 (four possible messages),
(4) an information system that informs the decision maker which
probability, if any, is above 1/3 (6 possible messages),
(5) an information system that informs the decision maker which
probability, if any, above .25 (7 possible messages), and
(6) the perfect information system in which the decision maker knows
the exact probabilities of the three states.
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Ten thousand trinomial distributions were ,generated according to
a uniform second-order distribution: pi = 1-R , p2 = S*(l-pl), p3 =
l-pl-p2 where R and S are uniformly distributed random fractions. Ten
thousand 3X3 utility matrices were randomly generated; the highest
utility in each matrix was 100 and the lowest zero, with other
utilities uniformly distributed. Each pairing of a criterion with an
information system selected an action, and the expected utility of
that action was recorded for a total of ten thousand iterations. The
lowest mean expected value was 64.255 (maximin criterion, null
information system), and the highest mean expected value was 71.748
(perfect information system).
In the present research, the same benchmark set of 10,000 probabil-
ity distributions and utility matrices was used to examine the perform-
ance of the decision criteria using the richer information provided by
probabilities rounded to the nearest tenth. The label "Round:1.0"
refers to the information system in which rounded probabilities are
forced to sum to 1.0, while the "Round:.9-1.1" label refers to the
information system which rounds the three probabilities separately.
For these two information systems, a fifth decision criterion is also
shown; in this criterion, the expected value is simply calculated
using the three rounded probabilities. (In the "Round:.9-1.1" system,
rounded probabilities are used without regard to whether they sum to
0.9, 1.0, or 1.1.)
Table 2 summarizes the findings of [Whalen, 1991] together with
the new experiment (the rows labeled "Round:.9-1.1" and "Round:1.0").
The table shows the mean expected utility of each combination of one
of the seven information systems with one of the four decision
criterion, expressed as a percentage of the range of mean expected
utility from the lowest to the highest; 0% means the lowest observed
utility (64.255) and 100% means the highest observed utility
(71.745). Thus, the percentages represent the proportion of the
maximum benefit that can be derived from probability information.
TABLE 2
None
Ordinal
Threshold-1/2
Threshold=l/3
Threshold=l/4
Round: 1.0
Round:. 9- 1.1
Perfect
# of
Messages
(1)
(6)
(4)
(6)
(7)
(66)
(166)
(10000)
Standard
Laplace
48.0%
48.0%
80.9%
48.0%
79.0%
95.8%
98.6%
100.0%
Maximin
0.0%
81.1%
78.0%
84.7%
85.2%
97.7%
98.8%
100.0%
Midpoint
33.9%
89.7%
86.4%
92.4%
91.6%
98.56%
99.1%
100.0%
Extended
Laplace
48.0
88.6%
88.6%
92.2%
92.3%
98.57%
99.5%
100.0%
As
Rounded
98.47%
99.4%
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Several interesting observations can be made based on these
results. Not surprisingly, there is a general tendency for the
performance of the various techniques to increase with increasing
richness of information as measured by the number of alternative
messages. But there are some noteworthy exceptions.
The Ordinal information system always leads to poorer performance
than the probability threshold 1/3 even though both have six messages;
furthermore, in the two representative probability approaches (Stand-
ard Laplace and Extended Laplace), the six-message Ordinal information
system is actually inferior to the four-message information system
with probability threshold .5! Under the Midpoint criterion, the
seven-message information system with threshold .25 is inferior to the
six-message information system with threshold 1/3, while under the
Standard Laplace criterion the four-message information system with
probability threshold .25 outperforms both six-message information
systems and the seven-message information system. The only decision
criterion which comes close to consistently rewarding richer inform-
ation with better performance is the Extended Laplace, although even
here the performance with ordinal information is very slightly poorer
than the performance with information based on a probability threshold
of .5.
Comparing decision criteria under a given information system, the
Extended Laplace consistently outperforms the others except in the
case of the Ordinal information system, in which it is not quite as
good as the Midpoint criterion. Despite strong theoretical
endorsements (Jaynes, 1968; Gottinger, 1990), the Standard Laplace is
consistently the worst except in the case of the information system
with probability threshold = .5, in which it is better than the
maximin criterion. These results seem to imply that the Extended
Laplace is the correct way to apply the principle of maximum entropy
to problems of this type.
The relationships among the decision criteria are summarized in
Figure 4 for the three probability threshold information systems and
the two rounded probability information systems. (The horizontal
axis, labeled "bandwidth," is the logarithm to the base 2 of the
number of messages in the information system, ranging from 2 bits for
the four-message system to 7.375 bits for the 166-message system.)
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Figure 1
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Figure 3
Probabilities Rounded to Nearest Tenth
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